Munangagwa’ s ‘No’ to lead Zimbabwe until 2030, a decoy to derail competitors
Hopewell Chin’ono
These are the resolutions passed at the ZANUPF Bulawayo Conference, outlined on the left card.
They include the constitutional violation campaign resolution to extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s term to 2030, effectively aiming to make the 86-year-old a life President, as he would be 92-years-old by 2030.
On the right is one of Mnangagwa’s 2030 campaign supporters and shock troopers, Taurai Kundishaya, insulting ZANUPF’s Legal Secretary, Patrick Chinamasa, for telling the country that Mnangagwa said he would not want to be president beyond 2028.
As I explained on Friday and yesterday in my social media posts, the ZANUPF conference resolutions need the ZANUPF Central Committee’s endorsement and ratification by a congress to take effect.
The ZANUPF congress is scheduled for 2027, but their constitution allows for an emergency or special congress anytime if need be.
The Central Committee, ZANUPF’s highest body outside of congress, meets four times a year, it met on Wednesday last week.
It is clear that Mnangagwa wants to remain president until 2030 because he has held meetings with the ZANUPF Youth Chair Tinoda Machakaire at State House to push this 2030 agenda, Machakaire has been one of the campaigners for Mnangagwa’s 2030 project.
This is the context behind Kundishaya’s insult towards Chinamasa on his Facebook page after yesterday’s congress, Mnangagwa is in it to win it.
The statements made yesterday by Chinamasa saying Mnangagwa is a constitutionalist were part of a calculated show after Mnangagwa realised significant resistance was mounting for his 2030 wish.
The Zimbabwean Independent newspaper reported that Zimbabwe’s Vice President, General Constantino Chiwenga, warned that the 2030 campaigners were taking ZANUPF back to the party political tensions of November 2017, when he became the military face of the coup that ousted Robert Mugabe.
If Mnangagwa genuinely opposed the 2030 campaign, that resolution would not have been included at the conference’s conclusion, as all resolutions must be approved by him before they are passed and publicly announced.
Why would he pass something he does not support unless he actually desires it?
What you saw yesterday was a carefully choreographed political act by Mnangagwa to ease the palpable political tensions knowing that he would strike another day.
The 2030 campaign remains active, and you will see his Lacoste (faction) supporters publicly echoing it after this conference.
The only person standing between Mnangagwa and his 2030 ambition is General Chiwenga.
Chiwenga must now be extremely vigilant, as Mnangagwa and his supporters are determined to succeed.
Chiwenga’s followers who are in denial about Mnangagwa’s resolve are living in cloud cuckoo land.
Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa is the shrewdest politician Zimbabwe has seen in its 44 years of post colonial rule.
He aspired to be president as early as 1980, patiently advancing his cause until he succeeded.
Chiwenga, however, did not dream of becoming president in 1980.
His rise was shaped by historical and political accidents, particularly mistakes made by Robert Mugabe and former military leader General Solomon Mujuru who respectively assumed that they could not be challenged.
Mnangagwa’s ascent was not achieved through the coup alone as Chiwenga’s people claim many times.
To gain Britain’s support for the 2017 coup led by Chiwenga, Mnangagwa had already made his case through then British Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Catriona Laing, who became a diplomatic ally and international commissar for Mnangagwa’s case.
He used multiple strategies, including soft power, engaging the international community through business.
His trusted legal advisor and nephew, Edwin Manikai, worked with business figures like Herbert Nkala to secure support in diplomatic circles.
Manikai is a gifted diplomatic operator, he even took the British ambassador and her husband to spend the weekend at his village home in Chivi, that is how close he became to the British while advancing his uncle’s cause.
That is why it is colloquially called a British coup in many diplomatic circles.
Currently, Chiwenga’s primary source of power lies in the military, where his close ally, General Anselem Nhamo Sanyatwe, commands the army.
Sanyatwe commanded the ground troops in the 2017 coup.
The book launch by former CIO Director-General and retired army general Happyton Bonyongwe, where Chiwenga was the guest of honour and Mnangagwa’s associates were conspicuously absent, was another indicator of the tensions and where individual loyalties lie.
The event was attended by prominent figures from Zimbabwe’s ZANLA forces. ZANLA was the ZANU military wing during the war of independence.
If another coup were attempted today, the international community would condemn it, and the goodwill that supported them in 2017 would no longer be present because of how they squandered many diplomatic opportunities as they pursued looting and plundering when they took over after removing Mugabe.
Mnangagwa is fully aware of this, which is why he is pursuing the political path in dealing with Chiwenga fully aware that another coup would not be embraced.
Moreover, the Commander of the Zimbabwean Defence Forces, General Valerio Sibanda, is Mnangagwa’s cousin, and they both come from the Midlands province.
That is why he wanted to bring Sibanda into the ZANUPF politburo, he is also reported to be part of his options to succeed him if 2030 fails.
Chiwenga’s civilian allies are nowhere near as effective as Mnangagwa’s team in privately making their case to influential countries.
Mnangagwa’s team as always presented Chiwenga as the problem, that is why every critic against Mnangagwa’s insatiable appetite to loot has been labeled a Chiwenga sympathiser.
Chiwenga is surrounded by individuals who make things difficult for him by abusing citizens online, such as George Charamba. In contrast, Mnangagwa’s team did the opposite in the lead-up to the 2017 coup, they presented him as a sensible, pro-business candidate and portrayed him as a victim of Mugabe kleptocracy.
Public support cannot be won if those around you mistreat citizens online, Mnangagwa knew this in 2027.
Mnangagwa has used his criminal networks to loot public funds, building a substantial war chest that he has used to bribe presidents, regional players, and even party secretary generals within the region, they know who they are.
To Mnangagwa, the army was and remains merely one tool to be used for his kleptocratic hegemony.
For Chiwenga, however, it is the only visible tool at his disposal to help him shape political consensus within their party and beyond.
He needs more than that because Mnangagwa is not letting go, and he has the money to buy people who can make his path to 2030 a reality.
Chiwenga’s path to power can be enhanced if he has thinkers business people around him who are held in high esteem in local and international circles that matter as Mnangagwa did with the likes of Manikai and Nkala towards 2027, he needs to unite the original ZANUPF cadres and bring in G40 and Gamatox factions who were vanquished and ostracised under Mnangagwa.
Mnangagwa’s determination is driven by people like Owen “Mudha” Ncube and a coterie of ministers who are unqualified to be in those positions, who know that Mnangagwa’s demise is a shared tragedy with them too, that will be their end.
The unspoken tragedy is that, just like in 2017, the Zimbabwean opposition has failed to take advantage of this power struggle. Also, as in 2017, some of them are offering their support to the warring ZANUPF factions.
Dare I say, just like in 2017, they will be used by either faction and left high and dry when the drama is settled.
As these two men fight to fulfil their ambitions, Zimbabwe continues to experience the highest inflation in the world, a 95% unemployment rate, hospitals lacking medicines and equipment, and it remains one of the most corrupt places to live, governed by a corrupt and incompetent administration.
If you want to engage me on this article you can email me at hopewell2@post.harvard.edu
